World The Colonial Pipeline Attack Is a Dark Omen
Gas Price Spike Feared as Ransomware Attack Shuts Colonial Pipeline Network
"The challenges brought on by the Colonial Pipeline shut down would likely not appear for several days or longer," one analyst estimated.Colonial Pipeline, the country's largest refined products pipeline operator, has not said who they suspect carried out the cyberattacks that typically involve criminal hackers seizing data and demanding payment for its return.
In North Carolina, where I live, only aboutare currently reporting that they have any gas, and that’s after some improvement in availability. A ransomware attack shut down a key pipeline supplying these stations, an event that could, but likely won’t, serve as a wake-up call, before we experience a true catastrophe.
Prior to the pandemic, Iabout digital security, or the lack thereof. I our security status quo to “building skyscraper favelas in code—in earthquake zones.” Not much has changed since then, but we are starting to hear more rumbles.
United States: Cyber attack on a pipeline operator, the state of emergency has been declared
© Via Reuters - Colonial Pipeline Petroleum Storage Site of Colonial Pipeline Company in Charlotte, North Carolina (Image D 'drawing). In the United States, the fuel supply of the coast is heavily disturbed after a cyber attack. The operation targeted the largest oil pipeline. President Joe Biden has just declared the state of emergency. with our correspondent in the United States, Loubna Anaki is a race against the watch that takes place at this moment in colonial Pipeline .
The dynamics of digital insecurity, ransomware, and related threats are eerily similar to the global public health dynamics before the pandemic.helps explain one key similarity: Networked systems are vulnerable. The premise of the series is that the battleship Galactica, and only Galactica, survived an by the Cylons (humanoid robots) on the human fleet simply because it was old and had just been decommissioned in the process of being turned into a museum. Being older, it had never been networked into the system. The “shutdown” command sent by the attackers never reached it, and it was thus spared.
In pandemic terms, Galactica was an island that no one could travel to.
Our software infrastructure is not built with security in mind. That’s partly because a lot of it depends on older layers, and also because there has been little incentive to prioritize security. More operating systems could have been built from the start with features such as “sandboxing,” in which a program can play only in a defined, walled-off area called a “sandbox” that is unreachable by anything else. If that program is malicious, it can do damage only in its sandbox. (This is analogous to the idea of “air gapping,” in which crucial parts of a network are unplugged from a network’s infrastructure.)
From dog poop to Nutella: the world's weirdest heists
There have been some incredibly ambitious heists around the world, stealing things one might expect like jewels, paintings, and cold hard cash. But what about those strange delinquents who aren’t out for an easy payday? From the strangely specific to the utterly inexplicable, check out this gallery to see some of the weirdest things people have ever stolen.
Adding security after the fact to a digital system that wasn’t built for it is very hard. And we are also surrounded by “technical debt,” programs that work but were written quickly, sometimes decades ago, and were never meant to scale to the degree that they have. We don’t mess with these rickety layers, because it would be very expensive and difficult, and could cause everything else to crumble. That means there is a lot of duct tape in our code, holding various programs and their constituent parts together, and many parts of it are doing things they weren’t designed for.
Our global network isn’t built for digital security. As I wrote in, the early internet was intended to connect people who already trusted one another, such as academic researchers and military networks. It never had the robust security that today’s global network needs. As the internet went from a few thousand users to more than 3 billion, attempts to strengthen security were stymied because of cost, shortsightedness, and competing interests.
AAA Warns on Gas Prices, North Carolina Invokes Emergency as Colonial Hackers Apologize
"Areas including Mississippi, Tennessee and the east coast from Georgia into Delaware are most likely to experience limited fuel availability and price increases, as early as this week," the American Automobile Association said on Monday.North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper, a Democrat, said that he declared a state of emergency to "prepare for any potential motor vehicle fuel supply interruptions across the state and ensure motorists are able to have access to fuel.
Even putting aside the security of our networks, our ordinary devices are sometimes shipped with passwords that are drawn from a preexisting list that includes the very-hard-to-crack “password,” “1234,” and “default.” In, I explained how vulnerable that leaves us, using the example of interlinked zombie baby-monitors being used to cripple infrastructure (such as by bringing down cell communication infrastructure in Liberia) or to censor journalists:
Most of our gizmos rely on generic hardware, much of it produced in China, used in consumer products worldwide. To do their work, these devices run software and have user profiles that can be logged into to configure them. Unfortunately, a sizable number of manufacturers have chosen to allow simple and already widely known passwords like “password,” “pass,” “1234,” “admin,” “default” or “guest” to access the device. In a simple but devastating attack, someone put together a list of 61 such user name/password combinations and wrote a program that scans the Internet for products that use them. Once in, the software promptly installs itself and, in a devious twist, scans the device for other well-known malware and erases it, so that it can be the sole parasite. The malicious program, dubbed Mirai, then chains millions of these vulnerable devices together into a botnet—a network of infected computers. When giant hordes of zombie baby monitors, printers and cameras simultaneously ping their victim, the targeted site becomes overwhelmed and thus inaccessible unless it employs expensive protections.
Colonial Pipeline cyberattacker identified by FBI as 'Darkside'
Colonial Pipeline cyberattacker identified by FBI as 'Darkside'FBI names 'Darkside' as Colonial Pipeline cyberattacker
Many problems like these aren’t fixed, because of what economists call “negative externalities”: Shipping software or devices like these is free, and fixing any issues that come up is expensive. Taking the latter, more expensive route provides no immediate reward. It’s like telling factories that they can pollute as much as they want, dumping their waste into the air or a nearby river, or they can choose to install costly filtering systems, in a setup where the pollution isn’t quickly visible through smell or appearance. You can guess what happens: The companies don’t worry about it, because they don’t have to.
It’s actually surprising that digital hacks and ransomware attacks don’t happen more, given how widespread these problems are. There has been hack after hack, thefts of profitable data (such as in), and devices being chained together for denial-of-service attacks—and . And just like with the pandemic, our digital vulnerability is rooted in a connected network with coupled vulnerabilities: Like the biological viruses that travel when we do, malware and software viruses can travel through interconnected networks (which are now everywhere, as software eats the world). And in a coupled system, when one thing goes wrong, it usually ends up dragging other things down with it. Tightly coupled systems are prone to cascading failures, in which one failure essentially triggers an avalanche.
Majority of Stations in Charlotte, North Carolina's Biggest City, Have Run Out of Gas
Up to 71 percent of stations in Charlotte have run out of gasoline as consumers rush to buy fuel.The Colonial Pipeline, which delivers about 45 percent of the fuel consumed on the East Coast, was hit by a ransomware attack last Friday. The attack has since resulted in shortages and inflated gas prices as consumers rushed to buy fuel across Southeastern states including North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and Florida.
Before bitcoin, there was no obvious way to monetize all of this digital malfeasance. Despite its freewheeling appearance, the global financial sector is fairly heavily regulated. People may be deceived by how easily money can be transferred here or there within the system, but laundering large amounts of illicit gains from outside the system into the kind of money that can be spent freely in legal markets is not that easy if the sums are large enough and the regulators in a few choke points are dead set against it. Of course, such laundering is done all the time, such as by large drug cartels, but those are large, professional operations and it’s not as easy even for them. These choke points include the, the United States Treasury and the , and the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, where Wall Street is located.
Of course, bitcoin changes this calculus, at least the temptation to try. It’s still not as easy as people might think to use bitcoin to move truly large amounts of money out of the system—to buy things with it, or turn it into cash. Small amounts, sure. The kind of sums that would make large-scale fraud attractive? That would be much harder without being traced. However bitcoin sure makes it more tempting to try, even for small sums. A lot of ransomware attacks aren’t for huge sums, meaning bitcoin and the cryptocurrency ecology have given ransomware a scalable business model, at least in the minds of its “entrepreneurs.”
Petrol Shortage In the United States: Colonal Pipeline restarts, return to progressive normal
© AFP - Seyllou A man Full of his car (image of illustration) The pipeline colonial pipeline, whose Operation has been hacked, could restart. After five days of chaos with gasoline pumps, a state of emergency declared in four states - Florida, Georgia, Virginia and North Carolina - the situation should soon return to normal. With our correspondent in New York, Carrie Nooten in just a few days, the piracy of Colonial Pipeline's pipeline caused panic.
This is a very costly problem to fix. A solution would require our government to shift its priorities. And we would need a regulatory environment to encourage and force different practices, to devote resources to the issue. Programs would need to be more reliable, crucial functions would need to be isolated, and external audits would need to be commonplace.
Some of the steps we could take on the financial side—such as targeting the ways in which people can launder money out of the crypto currencies they have acquired through such illicit activities—may be practically easy, but they raise a lot of thorny questions too. Would that mean finally looking at regulations for cryptocurrencies? That would bring up how they have become speculative tools as well, and that raises an issue that’s even more fundamental: how the global economy keeps producing asset bubbles and massive waves of speculation, like the one that led to the 2008 financial crisis. And that problem relates to the concentrated nature of global wealth chasing returns, and the lack of strong oversight for some of the implications of this chase. All of this is to say, just like with technical debt, duct-taping our way out of the immediate crisis does not address the fundamental problems.
Addressing digital insecurity would also entail providing better regulation up and down the technical stack, so that the negative externalities become, instead, internal issues for the companies and they’re responsible for solving the problems they create.
The more likely scenario is that there will be moves on the financial side (making it harder to launder large sums from crypto currencies into the regular financial system) and on the state-sector side (you can disincentivize another government from hacking your infrastructure, but doing that with independent players is much harder). There may also be efforts to “make an example” of few high-profile ransomware attempts: tracking down the perpetrators and handing down massive sentences. This isn’t as difficult as it sounds, but it requires resources. If ransomware attempts proliferate, punishment will not be as effective a deterrent, because most people will not be caught, given that so many are making attempts. This would set up a catastrophe lottery for the ransomware folks: Most of them probably will not be snared, but the few that do will be crushed.
Again, I’m reminded of our pre-pandemic era: We knew that a major threat was afoot, and that our infrastructure was lacking. We had the Ebola crisis from 2014 to 2016 where we worried more about slight risks to ourselves rather than strengthening our global response; we had SARS in 2003 which was barely averted from becoming a pandemic; and we had the HIV/AIDS catastrophe starting in the 1980s which also had an inexcusable delay in providing access to affordable medications globally. Did we move to truly fix the things that were revealed to be lacking from those experiences? We did not. Meanwhile, my Honda Civic has half a tank of gas, so I’ll be fine for now, but I’m not so sure about the future of the networked world.
How Hard Gas Shortages Are Hitting Each State, According to Drivers .
New data shows most gas stations in D.C. and North Carolina faced gas outages on Sunday evening.Almost nine in ten gas stations in Washington, D.C. and 58 percent of stations in North Carolina are out of fuel, new data from the GasBuddy app shows.