Opinion Afghanistan and the lessons that history does not offer
Poland, Belgium end Afghan evacuation as clock ticks down
WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Poland and Belgium ended their evacuations from Afghanistan, but other European nations vowed Wednesday to press on for as long as possible, as the clock ticks down on a dramatic airlift of people fleeing Taliban rule ahead of a full American withdrawal. President Joe Biden said he will stick to his Aug. 31 deadline for completing the U.S. pullout, as the Taliban insisted he must, ramping up pressure on the already risky operation to fly people out of Kabul. © Provided by Associated Press Hundreds of people gather near an evacuation control checkpoint outside the Hamid Karzai International Airport, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Wednesday, Aug.
Kabul1975. No, the Taliban and we are in Phnom Penh (still 1975). No, it's all over again. Biden is . No, he is or or . Afghanistan is the " ": 2021 is (when the Soviets withdrew from the country) which itself was just (when the British did) if not .
In today's commentaries on this last U.S. and NATO debacle in Afghanistan, historical comparisons abound. Looking for analogies means looking for the alleged, unequivocal lessons history can provide, the predictions its crystal ball can dispense and the ensuing prescriptions it offers to policymakers.
Latest on Afghanistan: Biden says US 'on a pace' for Aug. 31 pullout; Taliban block Afghans from airport
Biden added the deadline depends on Taliban cooperation, and added that he has asked the Depts. of State and Defense to prepare contingency plans.His remarks from the White House came the same day the Taliban said it would stop Afghans from trying to go to the Kabul airport and told women to stay home to stay for a time to stay safe, fueling worries about how the Taliban will treat women.
Thinking historically means "thinking in time," historian Ernest May and political scientist Richard Neustadt wrote in35 years ago. Or - to use an often-abused Churchillian mantra - " ." Hence the natural inclination to think analogically, to look for repetitions, cycles, precedents. Hence, therefore, the propensity to adopt a functional and instrumental attitude towards the study of the past: to look for a history à-la-carte capable of offering a practical toolbox, where we can instantly find the appropriate analogy needed to decrypt the often unintelligible present and avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.
In part, this is inevitable: the experience of the past offers indeed one of the few compasses we have to inform our analyses and choices. In part, it's a normal feature of the daily theater in which politicians, journalists and pundits often indulge, history and its supposedly unequivocal lessons granting the ultimate validation to a given stance or interpretation. In part, finally, it's, perhaps in the attempt to pitch its importance to university administrators intent on cutting funds to our departments, parents increasingly reluctant to see their kids studying "useless" stuff in college, and publishers always on the hunt for the winning instant book. If we produce applied knowledge, the argument goes, we must be important - as important as economists or political scientists, to mention some of our disciplinary mates and competitors.
What China, Iran, Pakistan, Other Afghanistan Neighbors Have to Say About New Taliban Government
The most senior working diplomats of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan took part in their first-ever virtual summit to discuss a common approach to Afghanistan's new Islamic Emirate.All six nations are grappling with the fallout.
And yet, as the cacophony of different, and at times antithetical, historical analogies currently invoked over Afghanistan clearly proves, thinking analogically can be highly problematic and even dangerous.
It can produce a very a-historical view of the past. Diachronic comparisons are intrinsically tricky, as it is a cyclical view of the historical process. The time in between the events we compare - indeed the very history - tends to disappear. Every dictator, from Milosevic to Saddam Hussein to Gadhafi, can then become the new Hitler, to mention the quintessential analogy that dominated post-World War II U.S. foreign policy discourse, that of(the lesson of history, here, being that you don't negotiate with dictators, because they are by definition unappeasable).
And if history moves by cycles, then it doesn't move at all - just as in a Monopoly game, we are periodically sent back to the start.
As world marks 9/11, Taliban flag raised over seat of power
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Taliban raised their iconic white flag over the Afghan presidential palace Saturday, a spokesman said, as the U.S. and the world marked the 20th anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks. The banner, emblazoned with a Quranic verse, was hoisted by Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, the prime minister of the Taliban interim government, in a low-key ceremony, said Ahmadullah Muttaqi, multimedia branch chief of the Taliban’s cultural commission. © Provided by Associated Press A man walks down the stairs at dusk in Kabul, Afghanistan, Saturday, Sept. 11, 2021.
Appealing as it is, the idea that by means of comparisons and cyclicity we can identify useful and applicable antecedents goes against the very nature of the study of history - which is not to simplify the past or "essentialize" its agents. Nor is it to pick and choose those past events we deem valuable today (and that often become worthless tomorrow). It is, instead, to recognize the inner opaqueness, and at times even messiness, of the historical process for how it unfolds over time; to study the process of change - at the same time non-linear and non-cyclical - that has led to the present; to understand how this change has shaped and shapes the context(s) in which we now are, and how they affect the behavior (and the options) of the actors that operate within such context(s).
Studying history is, in the end, a call for humility, empathy and understanding.
Humility because history teaches us the immense complexity of the past and the inevitable partiality of any explanation of it. Empathy, because awareness of this complexity helps us, at least in part, to get a better understanding of the reasons even of those actors we disagree with or find most obnoxious. Understanding, because through the study of history, by learning that there are no easy explanations for the past, we recognize that there are no simple and clear-cut political solutions for the present.
Studying history is in many ways an antidote to the many fallacies - epistemological and political - of the applied-history model. Even more, it's an antidote to the monumental hubris that two decades ago led some politicians and pundits to invoke the allegedly applicable and reproducible lessons of Japan and Germany 1945 in order to justify their policies in 21st Century Afghanistan and Iraq.
is professor of international history and history of U.S. foreign relations at SciencesPo-Paris
Defense secretaries in their own words: US 'invented reasons' to stay in Afghanistan .
The Taliban blitz exposes the failure of the 20-year Afghanistan war and portends terrorism threats, say former defense secretaries Panetta and Hagel.Afghan security forces, trained and equipped at the cost of $83 billion, wilted before Taliban fighters. With few exceptions, the Taliban rolled through provincial capitals without a fight despite a force of Afghan troops that was supposed to number more than 300,000. In reality, there were far fewer Afghan forces because of desertions and commanders who reportedly pocketed the pay of ghost soldiers they had kept on rolls. For those who remained and fought, there wasn't enough ammunition and food, to say nothing of pay.